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Abstract
This study investigates interest rate pass-through convergence for the eight Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs) that joined the European Union. Based on a unifying empirical pass-through
model that allows for thresholds, asymmetric adjustment, and structural changes, we ﬁnd that the pass-
through in many CEECs has become faster over time and is generally more complete than in the euro zone.
We ﬁnd evidence for convergence across CEECs with market concentration, bank health, foreign bank
participation and monetary policy regime as conditioning factors. No convergence of the CEEC pass-
through is found vis-a `-vis the heterogeneous euro zone.
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1. Introduction
The eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004 will soon be followed by an
eastern enlargement of the euro zone. While the so-called Maastricht criteria focus on nominal
convergence ofinﬂationrates, marketinterest rates and government deﬁcitsand debt, the issueof
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doi:10.1016/j.ecosys.2006.07.007convergence of ﬁnancial structures has recently become a focal point of the debate on the
European integration project for atleast two reasons: With respect to thegenuine objectiveof EU
integration policy to create a single European ﬁnancial market it is now widely recognized that
retail banking markets are still the least integrated ﬁnancial markets within the EU (for a recent
reviewsee, e.g., Baele etal., 2004).With respect tothe emergenceof a(more) homogenous euro-
zone monetary transmission, it has been argued that ‘‘differences in ﬁnancial structure are the
proximate cause for [these] national asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism’’
(Cecchetti, 1999). Pass-through (PT) studies which investigate how retail banking interest rates
react to changes in market interest rates can provide evidence on both issues: First, banking
markets are said to be integrating when different national bank rates react similarly to market
interest rate ‘‘news’’.
1 Secondly, if monetary transmission heterogeneities are mainly driven by
ﬁnancialstructuredifferences,thenPTconvergencemaybeattheheartofmonetarytransmission
convergence. Building on previous work for the incumbent euro zone (Sander and Kleimeier,
2004) we here explore both the potential for interest rate PT convergence across the eight central
and eastern European countries (CEECs) that joint the EU in 2004 and the potential for
convergence of this group vis-a `-vis the incumbent euro zone and some of its members.
Financial structure heterogeneity within the current European Monetary Union (EMU) is now
well documented by various strands of research.
2 Heterogeneity is also conﬁrmed in most euro-
zone PT studies that are based on a variant of the pioneering work by Cottarelli and Kourelis
(1994). Important contributions include BIS (1994), Cottarelli et al. (1995), Borio and Fritz
(1995),Mojon(2001),deBondtetal.(2002),SanderandKleimeier(2002,2004),Toolsemaetal.
(2002), Heinemann and Schu ¨ler (2003), de Bondt (2004), and De Graeve et al. (2004). Typically,
these studies ﬁnd considerable differences in the pass-through across the countries of the euro
zone. Moreover, a substantial degree of short-run bank interest rate stickiness and very limited
evidence fora full pass-through inthe long run isfound. Asymmetric adjustment of retailinterest
rates is also regularly documented. Finally, it is often argued that the single currency could act as
a unifying force that has the potential to make the PT faster, more complete and more
homogeneous. However, as argued by Sander and Kleimeier (2004), legal and cultural
differences may continue to preclude full convergence in the incumbent euro zone. So can
convergence towards a heterogeneous aggregate euro zone be meaningful? To address this issue
comprehensively, we investigate three different concepts of convergence: convergence across
CEECs, convergence of CEECs towards an aggregate euro zone and towards a few selected
incumbent euro-zone countries chosen as representatives for different legal families.
Given the diverse macro-economic developments and ﬁnancial structures in the new EU
member countries, one might hypothesize that a wider euro zone will lead to an even more
heterogeneous monetary policy transmission process. Until now, there exist only very few PT
studies for CEECs. These are often limited to individual countries such as the studies by Opiela
(1999), Wro ´bel and Pawłowska (2002), and Chmielewski (2004) for Poland, and Horva ´th et al.
(2004) for Hungary, or they relate to selected countries only, such as Crespo-Cuaresma et al.
(2004) and Kot (2004), who compare the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In all studies,
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1 Baele et al. (2004) classify cross-country PT-studies as a ‘‘news-based measure’’ of ﬁnancial market integration.
2 Recent overviews on ﬁnancial integration in the euro zone are given by Freixas (2003) and Baele et al. (2004). While
the latterstudy predominantly uses so-calledbeta-and sigma-convergence measures,Kleimeier and Sander(2000,2003),
and Schu ¨ler and Heinemann(2002)investigate retailbanking marketintegration usingcointegration methodology. Foran
application of the cointegration approach to CEECs see Brada et al. (2005).short-run stickiness of retail interest rates is conﬁrmed. The latter two studies furthermore report
evidence for a heterogeneous pass-through process across market interest rates and across the
three countries. However, the existing CEEC PT is not carved in stone, in particular as an
integrated banking market is generally considered a precondition for a smooth, efﬁcient and
homogeneous PT. For the euro-zone incumbents, it has been shown that the emergence of an
integrated European banking market so far was much slower than expected, mainly due to a lack
of cross-border lending and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, in CEECs,
participation of foreign banks is substantial and may thus play an important role for both an
eventual emergence of an integrated banking market and a more homogeneous PT process.
Furthermore, monetary stability can have an important homogenizing impact on the PT via low
inﬂation and low volatility of market interest rates (see e.g. Mojon, 2001; Sander and Kleimeier,
2004). Thus, an adoption of the euro may lead to more convergence. Our study will address these
issues and is thus not only the ﬁrst to investigate comparatively the PT in all eight EU transition
countries, but also to analyze the PT determinants in order to explore the potential for
convergence.
Our research strategy is as follows: We start by modeling the PT-process using the unifying
approach advocated in Sander and Kleimeier (2004) for all eight CEECs, for the aggregate euro
zone, and for the four individual euro-zone member countries selected as representatives of the
four ‘‘legal families’’. In order to take care of structural changes in the CEECs we follow Brada
et al. (2005) and apply a rolling regression approach. The obtained PT coefﬁcients are then used
to investigate convergence over time. We study both convergence across the CEECs and
convergence vis-a `-vis the aggregate euro zone and its four representative members. The plan of
the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodology and describes the data. Section 3
analyses the PT in CEECs and its convergence within the region. Section 4 analyses CEEC PT
convergence vis-a `-vis the euro zone. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
Our study focuses on eight CEECs; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland,theSlovakRepublic,andSlovenia,theaggregateeurozoneandthefourcountrieschosen
as representative for the different legal families Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Spain. For
CEECs we collect monthly data from January 1993 to December 2003 for retail interest rates on
mortgages, consumer loans, short- and long-term corporate loans, current account deposits, time
deposits and savings accounts. For the aggregate euro zone these series are only available as of
January 1996. We therefore also start the sample for individual euro-zone countries in 1996. It
should also be noted that the ECB discontinued their retail interest rate statistics in the second
half of 2003. Thus, we cannot extend our analysis beyond 2003. As a proxy for the central bank’s
policy rate we use a 1-month money market rate. The maturity choice is a matter of debate.
So-called cost-of-funds based studies are rooted in an industrial organization approach where the
market rate should reﬂect the marginal cost of funds. Thus, a matching and possibly longer
maturity is searched for. Studies that focus on monetary policy transmission theories (the so-
called monetary policy approach) typically employ a short-term market rate to avoid term
structure of interest rates issues. For CEECs, most authors focus on the monetary-policy
approach and use as a short-term money market rate the 1-month rate (Wro ´bel and Pawłowska,
2002; Kot, 2004; Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2004; Chmielewski, 2004), whereas Horva ´th et al.
(2004) use a 3-months rate. Opiela (1999) also uses a 3-months rate but also includes the
rediscount rate as an administratively controlled rate in his PT equation. Our choice of the
H. Sander, S. Kleimeier/Economic Systems 30 (2006) 405–423 4071-month rates thus allows for comparability of results. Our CEEC data sources are the web-sites
of the national central banks. Euro-zone data are obtained from the ECB.
3
Toaccount foranystructuralchanges inthe CEECs’ nationalbankingmarketswe conductour
analysis for 5-year rolling sub-periods from January 1993 to December 1997, January 1994 to
December 1998, and so on until the last rolling period from January 1999 to December 2003.
4
This leads to a total sample of 358 observations, of which 102 are loan observations and 256 are
deposit observations. In order to investigate convergence towards the incumbent euro zone we
have chosen to investigate convergence towards a structural-break free ‘‘post-break’’ period for
the aggregate euro zone and the four representative euro-zone countries. Here we determine
structural breaks endogenously using a rolling Chow-test methodology described in detail in
Hansen (1992).
We model the empirical PTanalysis by applying the unifying approach advocated in Sander
and Kleimeier (2004). This approach utilizes VAR and cointegration methodologies, allows
for asymmetric and threshold adjustment and follows an automatic model selection procedure.
Doing so has the advantage that the CEEC results obtained here are directly comparable with
the euro-zone results obtained in that earlier study. The PT model can take one of three basic
forms:
BRt ¼ b0 þ
X k 
i¼1
bBR;iBRt i þ b1Mt þ
X n 
i¼1




bBR;iDBRt i þ b1DMt þ
X n 
i¼1




bBR;iDBRt i þ b1DMt þ
X n 
i¼1
bM;iDMt i þ bECTECTt 1 þ et (3)
BRt ¼ u0 þ uMt þ ut (4)
ECTt 1 ¼ ut 1 (5)
where BRt and Mt are national retail and money market rates, respectively, and k
* and n
* indicate
the optimal lag lengths.
5 Eq. (1) describes the PTas a standard model in levels (STD_LL) and is
chosen when interest rates are I(0). When interest rates are I(1), the empirical PT model is best
estimated using ﬁrst differences as stated in Eq. (2). This standard speciﬁcation (STD) leads to a
loss of information about long-run relationships, which can be recovered if BR and M are
cointegrated. By estimating the long-run cointegration relationship (4), an error correction term
(ECT) can be obtained as shown in Eq. (5) and Eq. (2) then needs to be augmented by a lagged
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3 A full description of the data is available from the authors upon request.
4 We collect a total of 117 national retail interest rates. All series run until December 2003 but not all of them are
already available in 1993. Whereas most Czech rates start in 1993, Latvian and Lithuanian rates generally start in 1999
only (though some Lithuanian time deposit rates are available as of 1993). Overall, of our 117 series, 25% have data for
the rolling period 1993–1997, 29% for 1994–1998, 45% for 1995–1999, 59% for 1996–2000, 65% for 1997–2001, 66%
for 1998–2002, and 100% for 1999–2003.
5 Whenever an optimal lag length has to be determined, the minimum AIC criterion is used allowing for a maximum of
four lags.(ECTt 1) as shown in Eq. (3). If the ECT is deﬁned as in Eq. (5), a symmetric adjustment model
(SYM) is estimated where the adjustment mechanism is independent of the state of the dis-
equilibrium.Nextto the symmetric error-correction processwe also consider several asymmetric
speciﬁcations. These state-dependent models all belong to the group of threshold autoregressive
(TAR) models and differ with respect to the deﬁnition of the ECT:





rjI jut 1 with I jt ¼
I1t ¼ 1i f ut 1  a 
0 and0otherwise
I2t ¼ 1i f jut 1j<a 
0 and0otherwise






ECTt 1 ¼ Itr1Dut 1 þð 1   ItÞr2Dut 1 withIt ¼ 1ifDut 1  a 
0 and0otherwise (8)
A ﬁrst state-dependent adjustment mechanism allows for differing adjustment speed above or
below a given threshold a 
0. In the simplest case of the TAR
0 model this threshold is set to zero,
typically implying different adjustment speed when rates are above versus below their long-run
equilibrium. Thus, the ECT is deﬁned in Eq. (6) where It represents a Heaviside indicator for
different states of ut 1 and a 
0 ¼ 0. The second asymmetric model, TAR





*) deﬁned in Eq. (7), which can reﬂect interest rate smoothing as well as




depends on the recent change in deviation from equilibrium. M-TAR adjustment can reﬂect
behavior by banks, which attempt to smooth out large market rate changes.
6
In order to ﬁnd the empirical PT model that optimally ﬁts the data we start with unit root
testing. Based on the full sample period, we employ mean-shift, trend-shift and recursive unit
root tests that are consistent even in the presence of a structural break (Banerjee et al., 1992). In
case ofI(0)forbothBRand Mwe choose the STD_LLmodelasthe optimalpass-throughmodel.
Otherwise, we proceed with an (almost) automatic model selection procedure for each interest
rate during each of the rolling sub-periods. Here we start with cointegration testing. We ﬁrst
estimate all TAR-type models and select that model which according to the AIC criterion ﬁts the
data best.
7 For this model, we conduct cointegration and asymmetry tests following Enders and
Siklos (2001). If asymmetric cointegration is conﬁrmed, the pass-through model is set as the best
TAR-type model. If asymmetric cointegration is not conﬁrmed, we continue with symmetric
cointegration testing following Engle and Granger (1987). If symmetric cointegration is found,
the pass-through model is estimated as SYM. However, if symmetric cointegration is not found,
the pass-through model is set as STD.
We conduct this selection process for each of the rolling sub-periods. To enhance the
comparability of the multipliers and to allow for a meaningful second stage analysis of the
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6 The M-TAR model might turn out to be rather important for our PT modeling. Enders and Siklos (2001) provide
evidence for the US and show that conventional cointegration models such as the SYM model fail to detect cointegration
whereas there is clear evidence for M-TAR adjustment. Comparing SYM, TAR and M-TAR, they conclude: ‘‘the power
of the test for TAR adjustment is poor compared to that of the Engle–Granger test. However, for a plausible range of the
adjustment parameters, the power of the M-TAR test can be many times that of the Engle–Granger test.’’
7 The optimal threshold a 
0 is found by searching over the mid-80% of the distribution of ut and selecting the model for
which the residual sum of squares is minimized. This is in accordance with Chan (1993).determinants of the pass-through, we want to select for each national retail rate the same PT
model across all sub-periods. Thus, we need a decision rule to select one and only one PT model.
Our ﬁrst ruleis tochoose the model that occurs inthe absolute majority ofall rolling sub-periods.
If no model has the absolute majority, we repeat the estimation and selection procedure for the
fullsampleperiodandchoosethismodelforallsub-periods.
8Fortheaggregateeurozoneandthe
four member countries this is not necessary as only one post-break period exists. Based on the
selected PT model, we obtain multipliers of different time horizons (impact, 1, 3, 6, 12 months,
and long run) and different interest rate shocks ( 1%,  0.25%, +0.25%, +1%). b1 is the impact
multiplier. The long-run multiplier is given by u of Eq. (4) when interest rates are cointegrated.









Interim multipliers are simulated based on the estimated coefﬁcients of Eqs. (1)–(3).
The estimated PT multipliers are used to investigate heterogeneity and convergence. First, we
explorecountryandmarketdifferencesaswellasstructuralchangesovertime.Todoso,weusea
panel regression approach to test for PT differences across countries, markets and sub-periods
andregressallmultipliersofaspeciﬁctimehorizon(h)ondummiesforcountry(c)-,market(m)-,
and time (t)-speciﬁc effect as indicated in Eq. (10):









atdummyt þ ec;m;t (10)
Additionally, we use dummies for different types of monetary policy shocks to explore the
existence and nature of potential asymmetries. This approach is used for both a pure CEEC panel
to investigate intra-regional convergence and a panel with the euro zone as a convergence
benchmark.
In a second step we explore convergence forces further. In order to analyze intra-CEEC
convergence in more depth we replace as many dummies as possible by macro-economic control
variables and ﬁnancial structure variables. This strategy has been followed by Sander and
Kleimeier (2004) for the euro zone and has led to the conclusion that signiﬁcant legal family
dummies remain signiﬁcant, i.e. there are strong forces against convergence. Since we are
replicating the same methodology we do not redo this exercise here for the euro zone.
Concentrating on CEECs we have collected a large number of macro-controls and ﬁnancial
market descriptors. Aftersomeexperimenting, we settled fortwo macro-control—moneymarket
rate volatility (mmvol) deﬁned as the standard deviation of the monthly money market rates for
the respective rolling period and country under consideration and inﬂation deﬁned as the
percentage change on the previous year’s average annual harmonized index of consumer prices
(European Commission, 2004, Table 35). With respect to ﬁnancial market descriptors we have
ﬁnally selected three. The data for the ﬁrst two ﬁnancial structure variables are collected as
annual observations from the EBRD Transition Reports for 2002 and 2003 (EBRD, 2002, 2003).
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8 In 66% of all cases we have a perfect match, e.g. the selected PT model is also the one that is optimal for the speciﬁc
sub-period. Only in the remaining cases do we select a different model. Looking at the different deposit and loan rates
reveals that the match is especially good for mortgages, consumer loans, and time deposits. Here we perfectly match
about 80%.Toobtainameasureofforeigncompetition,arguablythebestproxywouldbetheshareofforeign
banks in total bank assets. Unfortunately, data for such a proxy are not available for the full
sampleperiod.Wethereforeemployanext-bestproxybasedontheEBRD’snumberfordomestic
and foreign-owned banks and construct frgbankp as the number of foreign banks as % of all
banks.
9 As a measure of bank health we use badloan deﬁned as non-performing loans in % of
total loans.
10 Finally, our third proxy CR3 measures the annual concentration of the national
banking market and is obtained from the World Bank (2003) Financial Development and
Structure Database. CR3 is deﬁned here as assets of the three largest banks in % of assets of all
commercial banks in the country. To correspond to our 5-year rolling samples, all annual
structural variables are converted to 5-year averages.
To explore convergence vis-a `-vis the euro zone we employ the concept of sigma convergence.
This concept suggests that convergence be best measured as a reduction in cross-country
variation over time. Our sigma (s) variable is deﬁned as the variation of individual country (c),
market (m), and time period (t) multipliers against the corresponding multipliers of the
benchmark region or country (x) in a structurally stable post-break period t
*:
sx ¼
jh multiplierc;m;t   h multiplierx;m;t j
h multiplierx;m;t 
(11)
By regressing s on a time trend, we test for a signiﬁcant reduction of cross-country variation
over time indicating sigma-convergence.
3. The pass-through and its convergence across CEECs
3.1. The pass-through in CEECs
From our PT regressions we obtain multipliers for all CEEC retail interest rates and seven
different overlapping periods. Table 1 provides simple averages of these multipliers to illustrate
ourcoreﬁndings.
11First,itappearsthatovertimethechangesintheCEECPTexhibitaV-shaped
adjustment, i.e. the impact and very short-run multipliers have decreased over time, while
long(er)-run multipliers have increased over time. Second, loan markets but not deposit markets
show on average a full PTwhich stands in contrast to the results obtained for the aggregate euro
zone. Nevertheless, the long-run PT tends to be more complete for loans than for deposits in the
CEEC as well as in the euro zone. Third, the PTis typically most efﬁcient with respect to lending
to the corporate sector and least efﬁcient with respect to current account and savings deposits. In
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9 The EBRD deﬁnes ‘‘number of banks (foreign-owned)’’ as: ‘‘number of commercial and savings banks, excluding
cooperative banks. Foreign-owned banks are deﬁned as those with foreign ownership exceeding a 50% share, end-of-
year’’. TheEBRD also reports the asset share offoreign banks for each of our CEECsbut this measure is onlyavailableas
of 1999. Furthermore, this measure cannot be replicated for euro-zone countries. Between 1999 and 2003, both measures
are highly correlated for the CEEC (0.70) and we are thus conﬁdent that we do not lose too much information when
employing the simpler proxy based on number of foreign banks.
10 The EBRD variable ‘‘non-performing loans (in % of total loans)’’ is deﬁned as: ‘‘ratio of non-performing loans to
total loans. Non-performing loans include substandard, doubtful and loss classiﬁcation categories for loans, but excludes
loans transferred to a state rehabilitation agency or consolidation bank, end-of-year.’’
11 Detailed results for this as well as all future analyses are available from the authors upon request. Due to our model
selection procedure, our multipliers are statistically signiﬁcant. However, in the TAR-type models it can be the case that
not all of the coefﬁcients of the ECTare signiﬁcant. The insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients tend to be small in comparison to the
signiﬁcant ones and thus do not unduly bias the estimated multipliers.contrast, the aggregate euro zone is characterized by a somewhat faster but clearly less complete
PT. In particular, comparing the PT in CEECs with the euro-zone PT in the period 1999–2003
reveals smaller long-run multipliers for all loan rates. Furthermore, the national multipliers also
illustrate the heterogeneity among euro zone countries. Finland appears tohave a faster and more
complete PT in the loan market but lacks behind in the deposit market. In contrast, Germany
appears to have the least complete loan PT but the most complete deposit PT.
To test for statistical signiﬁcance of these observations we use the second-stage
r e g r e s s i o n sa sd e ﬁ n e di nE q .(10) and reported in Table 2.
12 Taking into account the
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Table 1


















Impact Longrun Impact Longrun Impact Longrun Impact Longrun Impact Longrun
Panel A: loans
CEEC 1993–1997 0.77 0.78 0.87 0.81 0.49 0.51 1.01 1.03 1.00 1.03
1996–2000 0.26 0.79 0.18 1.01 0.15 0.52 0.33 0.82 0.43 1.08
1999–2003 0.21 0.95 0.11 1.04 0.12 0.77 0.35 0.93 0.25 1.14
Euro zone Post-break 0.23 0.62 0.21 0.69 0.10 0.40 0.34 0.75 0.26 0.64
Finland Post-break 0.61 0.97 0.36 0.98 0.62 1.01 n.a. n.a. 0.84 0.93
Germany Post-break 0.23 0.42 0.34 0.61 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.33 0.21 0.52
Ireland Post-break 0.51 0.65 0.54 0.82 0.46 0.63 0.59 0.52 0.44 0.63
Spain Post-break 0.43 0.77 0.19 0.79 n.a. n.a. 0.82 0.78 0.28 0.73










Impact Longrun Impact Longrun Impact Longrun Impact Longrun
Panel B: deposits
CEEC 1993–1997 0.49 0.44 0.52 0.45 0.36 0.38 n.a. n.a.
1996–2000 0.17 0.39 0.19 0.43 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.36
1999–2003 0.17 0.66 0.18 0.70 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.41
Euro zone Post-break 0.20 0.39 0.48 0.76 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.18
Finland Post-break 0.07 0.14 0.01  0.08 0.15 0.29 0.04 0.21
Germany Post-break 0.31 0.51 0.55 0.83 n.a. n.a. 0.06 0.18
Ireland Post-break 0.11 0.20 n.a. n.a. 0.11 0.20 n.a. n.a.
Spain Post-break 0.37 0.52 0.47 0.69 n.a. n.a. 0.26 0.36
Note: For the CEEC the average multiplier across all available countries and rates is reported. For the euro zone and
selected euro zone countries, the country-speciﬁc multiplier is reported. n.a. indicates that no multiplier could be
calculated as the interest rates is missing during the (sub)-sample period.
12 For convenience we only report multipliers for a +0.25% shock as this corresponds to the size of interest rate change
typically initiated by the ECB. Regarding the dummies, note that we use the following benchmark: Poland (because their
multipliers are closest to the overall average), mortgage rates (because their multipliers are closest to the overall average)
or time deposit rates (as it is the most frequent deposit rate), 1993–1997 (so that we can clearly see the development over
time comparedto the ﬁrstrollingperiod).We however also try other benchmarksandﬁnd asexpected that the coefﬁcients
change but that the relative ranking and thus the interpretation of the coefﬁcients remains unchanged.differences in loan and deposit markets we split the sample into two separate panels.
13 Panel
A reveals that the long-run PT in the loan market differs somewhat across countries, however,
only in Estonia (lower), the Slovak Republic (lower) and Slovenia (higher) we ﬁnd
statistically signiﬁcant differences in the long-run PT. Generally, the long-run PT has
i m p r o v e ds ot h a tl o a nm a r k e t sa r eo f t e nc h a r a c t e r i z e db yaf u l lP Ta n dn os i g n i ﬁ c a n t
differences across loan types are detected. It should however be noted that average long-run
multiplier is 0.91 for short-term corporate and 1.07 for long-term corporate loan rates,
respectively. For consumer loans the average is 0.59, but the insigniﬁcant consumer loan
dummy in our panel regression is caused by a high standard deviation for consumer loan
multipliers, thus revealing a high degree of heterogeneity in the consumer credit products and
the corresponding data.
14 Rather than in the size, differences are more pronounced in the
speed of the PT. Particularly, short-run adjustment is signiﬁcantly faster in corporate loan
markets. Finally, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction in the very short-run PT speed over time.
Thus, the V-shaped change of the PT process is conﬁrmed for the loan market. From Panel B
one can observe that there is much more variation in the deposit than in the loan market. This
is indicated by signiﬁcant country and market dummies and points to more heterogeneity
within and across national deposit markets. Again, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant V-effects,
i.e. short run multipliers have decreased and long-run multipliers have increased over the past
decade.
We have also explicitly tested for asymmetries by means of constructing a large panel
using all multipliers for all types of shocks (positive, negative, small large). However,
we found multipliers to be very similar and independent of the size or direction of the
monetary policy shock.
15 This lack of asymmetry is conﬁrmed by Crespo-Cuaresma et al.
(2004) for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and by Chmielewski (2004) for
Poland. For Hungary, however, Horva ´th et al. (2004) report asymmetries depending on the
size of the changes in money market rates and the size of the deviation from long-term
equilibrium.
In sum, we ﬁnd a quite homogeneous PT in CEEC lending markets where also a full PT
can often be observed. Both results are standing in some contrast to the on average
more heterogeneous and less perfect PT in the euro zone. Finally, the V-shape time pattern of
the adjustment of multipliers suggests that the monetary regime (as measured by money
market rate volatility), macro-economic developments, ﬁnancial reform and changes in the
ﬁnancial structure may have played an important role in changing the monetary transmission
process in CEECs. These PT determinants are explored in more detail in the following
section.
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13 When trying to explain market characteristics by variables describing ﬁnancial market structures one can show – as
expected – that these variables have different effects in loan and deposit markets. These can be captured by multiplying
the structural variables with a loan or deposit market dummy (see Sander and Kleimeier, 2004), respectively, or by
splitting the sample into two separate panels. Sincewe do have ample observations due to our rolling regression approach
we opt here for the second alternative.
14 Chmielewski (2004) also ﬁnds similarly high long-run multipliers for Polish corporate loan rates and a smaller long-
run multiplier for consumer credit rates.
15 This result is not surprising, sincewe select an asymmetric model in only about one quarter of all cases. This is partly
due to the fact that asymmetry is indeed rejected but is also inﬂuenced by our decision to use only one model per country
and market.H. Sander, S. Kleimeier/Economic Systems 30 (2006) 405–423 414
Table 2
Country, rate, and time patterns in the pass-through in CEECs
Independent
variable
Dependent variable = multipliers for a +0.25% shock
Impact 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months Long-run
Panel A: loan rates
Intercept 0.37 (2.57) 0.42 (2.99) 0.39 (2.48) 0.36 (2.08) 0.20 (1.15) 0.14 (0.61)
Czech Republic 0.09 (0.78)  0.08 ( 0.75)  0.27 ( 2.22)  0.40 ( 2.98)  0.33 ( 2.24)  0.27 ( 1.44)
Estonia 0.01 (0.06)  0.14 ( 1.51)  0.29 ( 2.82)  0.36 ( 3.26)  0.38 ( 3.05)  0.33 ( 2.11)
Hungary 0.23 (2.71) 0.24 (2.83) 0.12 (1.25) 0.08 (0.78) 0.15 (1.26) 0.19 (1.32)
Latvia 0.14 (1.12) 0.02 (0.20)  0.10 ( 0.73)  0.10 ( 0.67) 0.08 (0.47) 0.26 (1.23)
Lithuania 0.07 (0.63)  0.18 ( 1.54)  0.29 ( 2.31)  0.36 ( 2.58)  0.22 ( 1.42)  0.03 ( 0.15)
Slovak Republic 0.04 (0.36)  0.23 ( 2.28)  0.48 ( 4.38)  0.64 ( 5.28)  0.62 ( 4.56)  0.57 ( 3.39)
Slovenia 0.36 (4.32) 0.38 (4.52) 0.43 (4.59) 0.50 (4.90) 0.68 (6.00) 0.84 (5.95)








0.23 (3.21) 0.20 (2.78) 0.25 (3.12) 0.24 (2.76) 0.21 (2.19) 0.14 (1.15)
1994–1998  0.05 ( 0.37) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.11) 0.02 (0.09)
1995–1999  0.34 ( 2.71)  0.10 ( 0.81) 0.09 (0.66) 0.26 (1.75) 0.36 (2.16) 0.40 (1.92)
1996–2000  0.44 ( 3.58)  0.21 ( 1.72) 0.04 (0.29) 0.20 (1.36) 0.31 (1.86) 0.39 (1.88)
1997–2001  0.38 ( 3.19)  0.14 ( 1.15) 0.16 (1.18) 0.37 (2.60) 0.55 (3.42) 0.65 (3.23)
1998–2002  0.43 ( 3.61)  0.24 ( 2.04) 0.02 (0.16) 0.19 (1.35) 0.36 (2.26) 0.47 (2.35)
1999–2003  0.40 ( 3.39)  0.24 ( 2.02) 0.04 (0.31) 0.25 (1.76) 0.45 (2.82) 0.70 (3.55)
Adjusted R
2 50% 62% 65% 67% 67% 60%
Panel B: deposit rates
Intercept 0.42 (7.24) 0.45 (6.74) 0.62 (7.70) 0.64 (7.60) 0.54 (5.60) 0.37 (2.57)
Czech Republic  0.03 ( 0.85)  0.19 ( 4.00)  0.37 ( 6.61)  0.42 ( 7.12)  0.38 ( 5.54)  0.29 ( 2.85)
Estonia 0.17 (3.77) 0.02 (0.38)  0.21 ( 3.43)  0.32 ( 4.83)  0.31 ( 4.18)  0.30 ( 2.71)
Hungary 0.12 (2.49) 0.16 (2.74) 0.20 (3.01) 0.16 (2.18) 0.11 (1.36) 0.10 (0.83)
Latvia 0.04 (0.77)  0.10 ( 1.77)  0.34 ( 5.00)  0.43 ( 6.06)  0.45 ( 5.49)  0.57 ( 4.66)
Lithuania  0.13 ( 3.66)  0.19 ( 4.67)  0.41 ( 8.37)  0.47 ( 8.95)  0.41 ( 6.82)  0.28 ( 3.10)
Slovak Republic  0.09 ( 2.47)  0.23 ( 5.19)  0.50 ( 9.50)  0.61 ( 10.87)  0.61 ( 9.50)  0.59 ( 6.13)
Slovenia 0.22 (5.68) 0.22 (4.77) 0.12 (2.19) 0.16 (2.76) 0.30 (4.59) 0.53 (5.44)
Current account
deposits
 0.12 ( 2.20)  0.24 ( 3.94)  0.50 ( 6.74)  0.57 ( 7.40)  0.55 ( 6.16)  0.46 ( 3.45)
Savings accounts  0.18 ( 4.94)  0.22 ( 5.17)  0.31 ( 6.07)  0.38 ( 6.91)  0.43 ( 6.86)  0.50 ( 5.37)
1994–1998  0.01 ( 0.17) 0.13 (1.86) 0.18 (2.14) 0.19 (2.17) 0.20 (2.04) 0.22 (1.50)
1995–1999  0.21 ( 3.76)  0.08 ( 1.19) 0.06 (0.76) 0.13 (1.64) 0.20 (2.07) 0.27 (1.95)
1996–2000  0.24 ( 4.38)  0.13 ( 2.08)  0.01 ( 0.08) 0.07 (0.91) 0.15 (1.63) 0.24 (1.71)
1997–2001  0.26 ( 4.86)  0.14 ( 2.14) 0.02 (0.32) 0.13 (1.60) 0.26 (2.88) 0.38 (2.78)
1998–2002  0.28 ( 5.08)  0.12 ( 1.91) 0.00 (0.06) 0.10 (1.27) 0.23 (2.49) 0.40 (2.95)
1999–2003 0.24 ( 4.40)  0.12 ( 1.86) 0.02 (0.23) 0.13 (1.63) 0.28 (3.06) 0.60 (4.43)
Adjusted R
2 51% 51% 58% 63% 60% 48%
Note: For each independent variable, the given values are the estimated coefﬁcient and the values within the parentheses
are the t-statistic. All independent variables are dummies. In Panel A and B the regressions are based on samples of 102
and256observations,respectively.Thesamplesinclude1993to2003.Regardingthecountry,timeandratedummiesnote
that the benchmark case is deﬁned by Poland, mortgage rates or time deposit rates, 1993–1997.3.2. Structural determinants of the pass-through in CEECs
We have experimented with several ﬁnancial structurevariables and macro-controls in second-
stage regressions separated for loan, deposit, and – given the signiﬁcant differences in the deposit
markets– time deposit markets.
16 This notonly allows us to identify the mostimportant structural
determinantsbutalsotoinvestigatewhetherandtowhatextentcountryormarketcharacteristicsare
eventually precluding full convergence across CEECs. To control for differing macroeconomics
conditions we have initially included GDP growth, inﬂation, ﬁnancial development (as measured
bytheratioofcredittoGDP)andmoneymarketratevolatility.Theﬁnancialdevelopmentvariable,
however, does not systematically explain the PT pattern while at the same time introducing
multicollinearity problems. GDP growth is found to be insigniﬁcant in all regressions and the
goodnessofﬁtistypicallyhigherwithoutthisvariable.Forthesubsequentanalysiswethereforeopt
to exclude these twomacro-controls. When investigating the role ofinﬂationinan approachusing
macro-controls only, we ﬁnd that higher inﬂation leads to a somewhat higher speed of the PT
process after several months and also increases the long-run multipliers. These effects weaken
somewhat when introducing ﬁnancial market structure variables, but we ﬁnd them important
enoughtoincludeinﬂationeveninaveryparsimoniousapproach.Aspecialroleisplayedbymoney
market rate volatility (mmvol). Studies have shown that money market volatility is positively





deposit rates somewhat faster under a more unstable monetary policy regime while in the longer-
termhighmoneymarketvolatilitywouldinfactslowdownthetransmission,reducethePTandthus
eventually lead to higher intermediation margins. This effect is conﬁrmed independent of the
speciﬁcation of the subsequently discussed regressions, which contain alternative ﬁnancial
structure descriptors. As the latter variables have different effects in loan and deposit markets we
analyze their role in separate panels (see Table 3).
Our ﬁnal speciﬁcation includes next to mmvol and inﬂation measures of banking market
concentration (CR3), bank health (badloan), and foreign bank participation (frgbankp). The ﬁrst
two variables generally have the expected signs,
17 are statistically signiﬁcant and help to explain
around 50% of the loan market multiplier variations in CEECs. The last variable frgbankp,
however, carries in a ﬁrst estimate an implausible negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. We
hypothesizethatthiscounterintuitiveresultmaylargelybeduetotheinclusion ofSlovenia.From
the individual country multipliers we know that the pass-through is faster and more complete in
Slovenia than in other countries. However, the asset-share of Slovenia’s state-owned banks
remained extraordinarily high with over 40% for the whole sample period. At the same time its
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16 Our model selection process follows a stepwise approach. It starts from the dummy regression model by ﬁrst adding
all four potential macro-controls of which only two turned out to be more or less consistently signiﬁcant. These results
have also been cross-checked by running single and multiple regressions without dummies. In a second step we add
ﬁnancial structure variables to the macro-control augmented dummy model. The selection of these variables is informed
by both theoretical and empirical considerations, again including results from simple regression, correlation and
multicollinearity analyses. After adding all macro-controls and ﬁnancial variables to the original dummy model all
non-signiﬁcant dummy variables are eliminated.
17 There is one exemption: CR3 has a ‘‘perverse’’ positive inﬂuence on the impact deposit multiplier.H. Sander, S. Kleimeier/Economic Systems 30 (2006) 405–423 416
Table 3
Structural determinants of the pass-through in CEECs
Independent
variable
Dependent variable = multipliers for a +0.25% shock
Impact 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months Long-run
Panel A: loan rates
Intercept  0.10 ( 0.37)  0.01 ( 0.02) 0.50 (1.52) 0.97 (2.60) 1.57 (3.80) 2.21 (4.28)
mmvol 5.32 (5.68) 3.37 (3.56) 0.72 (0.66)  1.80 ( 1.46)  3.82 ( 2.80)  5.47 ( 3.20)
Inﬂation  1.32 ( 1.79) 0.58 (0.79) 0.45 (0.53) 1.39 (1.43) 1.39 (1.30) 0.12 (0.09)
CR3  0.23 ( 1.00)  0.44 ( 1.86)  0.77 ( 2.83)  0.98 ( 3.17)  1.28 ( 3.73)  1.47 ( 3.45)
Badloan  0.63 ( 2.20)  1.00 ( 3.43)  1.19 ( 3.57)  1.47 ( 3.86)  1.75 ( 4.16)  2.16 ( 4.10)
frgbankp   (1  
Slovenia dummy)
0.50 (1.53) 0.66 (1.97) 0.49 (1.28) 0.10 (0.22)  0.40 ( 0.83)  0.86 ( 1.43)
Slovenia dummy 0.59 (3.00) 0.77 (3.85) 0.79 (3.45) 0.65 (2.50) 0.47 (1.62) 0.26 (0.73)
Short-term corporate
loan dummy
0.23 (4.62) 0.23 (4.58) 0.27 (4.68) 0.28 (4.13) 0.27 (3.63) 0.23 (2.50)
Long-term corporate
loan dummy
0.19 (3.48) 0.21 (3.96) 0.27 (4.43) 0.28 (4.04) 0.28 (3.55) 0.25 (2.55)
Adjusted R
2 55% 65% 65% 65% 65% 57%
Panel B: deposit rates
Intercept  0.38 ( 3.55)  0.16 ( 1.37) 0.22 (1.43) 0.54 (3.14) 0.82 (4.05) 1.11 (3.67)
mmvol 2.75 (9.04) 2.91 (8.67) 2.01 (4.55) 1.35 (2.75) 0.59 (1.03)  0.21 ( 0.24)
Inﬂation  0.48 ( 1.26) 0.25 (0.58) 2.12 (3.81) 2.36 (3.80) 2.21 (3.06) 0.96 (0.88)
CR3 0.22 (2.14) 0.01 (0.09)  0.44 ( 2.89)  0.70 ( 4.12)  0.79 ( 3.97)  0.76 ( 2.56)
Badloan  0.73 ( 6.14)  0.94 ( 7.19)  1.32 ( 7.65)  1.33 ( 6.94)  1.36 ( 6.06)  1.35 ( 4.01)
frgbankp   (1  
Slovenia dummy)
0.89 (7.64) 0.78 (6.12) 0.70 (4.16) 0.48 (2.54) 0.18 (0.81)  0.12 ( 0.36)
Slovenia dummy 0.70 (10.46) 0.69 (9.34) 0.64 (6.52) 0.59 (5.42) 0.53 (4.20) 0.54 (2.82)
Current account
deposit dummy
 0.14 ( 2.93)  0.21 ( 3.90)  0.40 ( 5.59)  0.45 ( 5.66)  0.43 ( 4.56)  0.29 ( 2.08)
Saving account
dummy
 0.17 ( 4.76)  0.24 ( 6.04)  0.35 ( 6.71)  0.42 ( 7.27)  0.47 ( 7.01)  0.54 ( 5.38)
Adjusted R
2 53% 59% 57% 57% 53% 37%
Panel C: time deposit rates
Intercept  0.49 ( 3.74)  0.26 ( 1.88) 0.02 (0.12) 0.37 (1.78) 0.67 (2.76) 0.97 (2.52)
mmvol 2.84 (7.96) 2.77 (7.32) 1.59 (3.24) 0.77 (1.38)  0.18 ( 0.27)  1.37 ( 1.30)
Inﬂation  0.33 ( 0.73) 0.81 (1.68) 3.33 (5.35) 3.57 (5.02) 3.49 (4.16) 2.76 (2.06)
CR3 0.30 (2.25) 0.08 (0.55)  0.25 ( 1.35)  0.57 ( 2.71)  0.64 ( 2.59)  0.57 ( 1.43)
Badloan  0.78 ( 5.82)  0.99 ( 6.90)  1.41 ( 7.58)  1.42 ( 6.72)  1.46 ( 5.83)  1.56 ( 3.92)
frgbankp   (1  
Slovenia dummy)
0.90 (6.51) 0.73 (4.95) 0.60 (3.16) 0.38 (1.76) 0.03 (0.12)  0.32 ( 0.78)
Slovenia dummy 0.73 (9.21) 0.68 (8.11) 0.61 (5.57) 0.57 (4.57) 0.50 (3.41) 0.49 (2.07)
Short maturity
dummy
0.05 (1.28) 0.08 (1.89) 0.18 (3.28) 0.14 (2.23) 0.15 (2.03) 0.15 (1.26)
Corporate
deposit dummy
0.07 (2.91) 0.09 (3.48) 0.12 (3.86) 0.15 (3.99) 0.13 (3.07) 0.13 (1.85)
Adjusted R
2 56% 63% 63% 61% 57% 39%
Note: For each independent variable, the given values are the estimated coefﬁcient and the values within the parentheses
are the t-statistic. All excluded rate, country, and time dummies were found to be insigniﬁcant. In Panel A–C the
regressions are based on samples of 102, 256, and 197 observations, respectively. The samples include 1993–2003.share of foreign bank participation of about 11% is very low by CEEC standards.
18 When
introducing a Slovenia dummy in combination with frgbankp, the counterintuitive result for
foreign bank participation for the remaining countries in fact disappears. Our preferred
speciﬁcation of the loan market multiplier determinants is thus given in Panel A in Table 3. Here
we show thatforeign participationhas the potential to speed up the PTprocess, particularlyin the
deposit market. This effect is marginally visible in the lending markets but only to a lesser extent
and only in the very short run. The long-run PT is not signiﬁcantly affected by this variable. It
should, however, be noted that the results show that the PT to corporate loan rates according to
this model is not only faster, but also more complete. Nevertheless, even then the Slovenia
dummy, but only the Slovenia dummy, remains signiﬁcantly positive. Finally, all time dummies
are insigniﬁcant and are consequently dropped. The results therefore suggest conditional
convergence.Ifconcentration,bankhealth,andthemonetarypolicyregimewillconverge,sowill
the ﬁnancial part of the monetary transmission process in CEECs. This conditional convergence
feature distinguishes the new EU members and potential euro-zone newcomers from the much
more heterogeneous incumbents.
Turning to deposit markets as reported in Panel B of Table 3, our ﬁnal regressions show that
the speciﬁcation reached for the loan market is also the most appealing here. Less concentration,
less bad loans, and more foreign participation (in all countries but Slovenia) lead to a faster PT.
The Slovenia dummy remains positive and signiﬁcant. Money market ratevolatility has a special
impacthere:Thehigheritis,thefasterthePTintheveryshortrun.Butithaslittleornoimpacton
the longer-run multipliers or even on the completeness of the PT. Likewise, higher inﬂation leads
to a faster PTonly in the interim period. A more stable monetary policyregimewith low inﬂation
thus has the potential to slow down the medium-term PT.
Sinceweﬁndcurrentaccountandsavingaccountratesreactingmuchslowerthantimedeposit
rates and giventhe largeamount of data on time deposit rates we alsorun separate PTregressions
for time deposits. Panel C in Table 3 reveals that most results of the deposit regressions can be
conﬁrmed. Additionally, we can show that the PT is faster for short maturities and time deposits
from the corporate sector. In the latter case, the PT is also more complete.
Insum,thePTinCEECsisquiteefﬁcient andhomogeneous,withthepotentialforconditional
convergence depending on a uniﬁed monetary regime and integrating ﬁnancial structures.
Moreover, foreign bank participation has a positive effect, particularly on deposit rate ﬂexibility
in the short run.
4. CEEC convergence towards the euro zone?
Our results for the CEECs stand in sharp contrast to the pattern found in the euro zone where
‘‘legal and cultural differences may continue to preclude full convergence’’ (Sander and
Kleimeier, 2004, p. 490). As such it is questionable what convergence towards a heterogeneous
euro zone should mean. First, we will therefore explore convergence not only vis-a `-vis an
artiﬁcially aggregated euro zone but also vis-a `-vis legal family representatives. Here in
particular, Germany will stand for the German legal family, Finland for the Scandinavian legal
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18 Opiela (1999, p. 5) argues that the central bank may play the role of an oligopolistic leader and thus may try to
‘‘...reduceloan ratestickiness throughsignaling a desire for loanrates to change by altering the administrativerate.This
practice is notonly widespread, butmayalso havemorerelevance in aneconomy dominatedby state-ownedbanks whose
managers have been used to following administrative orders rather than subtle market signals.’’family, Spain for the French legal family, and Ireland for the British legal family. A second issue
is what convergence means when the region towards which convergence is measured is itself
moving. Of course, when both sides are moving, convergence still makes sense. But if the PT in
the euro zone is stable, it is more advisable to test for convergence against a stable post-break
period. In fact, we are able to obtain post-break periods for the aggregate euro zone with breaks
located between late 1997 and early 1999. These breaks are generally compatible with the
individual-country breaks documented in Sander and Kleimeier (2004) and will thus be used in
the subsequent convergence analysis. These post-break periods have the advantage of being
longer than the rolling periods and thereby make the results of the PTanalysis more reliable. Our
estimates of the aggregate euro zone’s as well as the individual countries’ PTare in line with the
ﬁndings in the literature: short-run stickiness, no long-run full PT, and large country differences.
Table 1 illustrates.
For our analysis we construct a panel with the aggregate euro zone as the benchmark
region. As a ﬁrst step, our estimated multipliers serve as dependent variables and we conduct
regressions similar to those in Table 2 but now with the euro zone as the benchmark country.
Table 4 reveals that time dummies are generally not signiﬁcant with exemption of very recent
changes in the long-run multipliers for deposits. Second, the country dummies indicate no
clear relative PT performance of CEECs vis-a `-vis the aggregate euro zone: Some countries are
faster, some slower, some do not differ signiﬁcantly. Third, having controlled for country
effects, it is remarkable that the PT speed for corporate loans are signiﬁcantly higher than for
mortgages or consumer loans. Similarly with respect to deposits, the negative dummies for
savings and current account deposits indicate relatively more speed and size for the time
deposit PT.
Inasecondstep,weemploytheconceptofs-convergence.Hereourdependentvariableissas
deﬁned in Eq. (11). We report the results in Table 5 and can make three observations: First,
regarding the absolute value of the variation as shown in intercepts, second, regarding changes
over time based on the trend variable, and third, regarding product-speciﬁc effects based on the
loan- and deposit-type dummies. Regarding the absolute value of sigma vis-a `-vis the aggregate
euro zone, we ﬁnd that loan markets are showing more heterogeneity than deposit markets as
higher values for the intercept reveal. Moreover, heterogeneity is most pronounced in short-run
adjustments. Over time, short-run heterogeneity is increasingly reduced as CEECs are
‘‘converging’’ towards the euro zone’s higher loan rate stickiness. With respect to ﬁnancial
products, private households are typically facing more heterogeneity than the corporate sector as
it is signiﬁed by the positive dummies for consumer loans as well as for current account and
savings deposits.
While little evidence for convergence towards an aggregate euro-zone PTis found, will one or
several representative countries then do a better job to act as a ‘‘role model’’? From the sheer
numbers, the CEEC PTis furthest away from the German loan PT. This is particularly true in the
longrunwhere GermanyisoftenfarawayfromafullPT.Nevertheless,thereductioninshort-run
PT in CEECs brings these countries closer to German and Spanish lending rate stickiness. On
deposit markets the evidence is more mixed given the variety of deposit models.
19
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19 Thesigmaconvergence resultstowardsFinlandindepositmarketsshouldbereadwithreservation.Theyaredrivenby
insigniﬁcant multipliers for Finish deposits markets, which are often close to zero or – at times – even negative (see
Table 1). Thus, this particular panel does not allow a meaningful interpretation of the results.In sum, we ﬁnd little evidence for convergence, neither towards an aggregate euro-zone PT
nor towards a role-model PT. At the current moment it would thus be premature to talk of
convergence. However, two observations already made in the previous section remain relevant.
The short-run price ﬂexibility in CEECs is getting lower, while there is a trend towards a more
complete PT in the long run.
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Table 4
Country, rate, and time patterns in the pass-through in CEECs and the aggregate euro zone
Independent
variable
Dependent variable = multipliers for a +0.25% shock
Impact 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months Long-run
Panel A: loan rates
Intercept 0.09 (1.14) 0.36 (4.31) 0.50 (5.21) 0.45 (4.30) 0.46 (3.84) 0.62 (4.05)
Czech Republic 0.14 (1.37)  0.02 ( 0.18)  0.14 ( 1.10)  0.17 ( 1.21)  0.17 ( 1.09)  0.25 ( 1.25)
Estonia  0.15 ( 2.02)  0.27 ( 3.30)  0.29 ( 3.10)  0.20 ( 1.91)  0.22 ( 1.91)  0.26 ( 1.72)
Hungary 0.10 (1.43) 0.14 (1.89) 0.13 (1.54) 0.22 (2.33) 0.24 (2.28) 0.18 (1.32)
Latvia  0.01 ( 0.05)  0.10 ( 0.91)  0.10 ( 0.75) 0.08 (0.52) 0.25 (1.52) 0.35 (1.69)
Lithuania  0.08 ( 0.84)  0.31 ( 3.06)  0.30 ( 2.55)  0.19 ( 1.44)  0.06 ( 0.40) 0.06 (0.32)
Poland  0.16 ( 2.06)  0.12 ( 1.44) 0.01 (0.15) 0.17 (1.67) 0.16 (1.36) 0.07 (0.47)
Slovak Republic  0.09 ( 1.01)  0.30 ( 3.25)  0.44 ( 4.02)  0.44 ( 3.71)  0.45 ( 3.36)  0.52 ( 3.05)
Slovenia 0.11 (1.53) 0.17 (2.24) 0.36 (4.16) 0.65 (6.92) 0.86 (8.11) 0.94 (6.85)
Consumer loans  0.02 ( 0.33)  0.11 ( 1.68)  0.11 ( 1.44)  0.05 ( 0.59)  0.07 ( 0.71)  0.16 ( 1.31)
Short-term
corporate loans
0.24 (3.93) 0.18 (2.68) 0.17 (2.23) 0.22 (2.59) 0.20 (2.15) 0.11 (0.93)
Long-term
corporate loans
0.24 (3.72) 0.16 (2.40) 0.17 (2.17) 0.20 (2.30) 0.19 (1.92) 0.08 (0.66)
1997–2001 0.06 (0.89) 0.07 (1.01) 0.09 (1.13) 0.13 (1.42) 0.17 (1.70) 0.14 (1.06)
1998–2002 0.02 (0.36) 0.00 ( 0.04) 0.00 (0.01)  0.01 ( 0.13) 0.00 (0.05)  0.03 ( 0.22)
1999–2003 0.04 (0.54) 0.00 ( 0.07) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.19) 0.07 (0.75) 0.17 (1.33)
Adjusted R
2 33% 50% 56% 62% 64% 56%
Panel B: deposit rates
Intercept 0.33 (7.12) 0.49 (8.90) 0.64 (8.85) 0.67 (8.70) 0.66 (7.34) 0.60 (4.22)
Czech Republic  0.09 ( 1.72)  0.24 ( 3.94)  0.27 ( 3.50)  0.28 ( 3.34)  0.25 ( 2.63)  0.21 ( 1.35)
Estonia 0.01 (0.18)  0.16 ( 2.57)  0.25 ( 3.06)  0.27 ( 3.15)  0.27 ( 2.74)  0.28 ( 1.75)
Hungary 0.00 ( 0.02) 0.03 (0.49) 0.17 (1.96) 0.19 (2.04) 0.16 (1.52) 0.12 (0.71)
Latvia  0.12 ( 2.23)  0.28 ( 4.33)  0.38 ( 4.46)  0.39 ( 4.34)  0.42 ( 3.93)  0.54 ( 3.24)
Lithuania  0.29 ( 6.26)  0.41 ( 7.27)  0.50 ( 6.85)  0.49 ( 6.22)  0.44 ( 4.88)  0.32 ( 2.25)
Poland  0.15 ( 3.36)  0.17 ( 3.16)  0.04 ( 0.54) 0.04 (0.51) 0.04 (0.45) 0.03 (0.24)
Slovak Republic  0.24 ( 5.04)  0.38 ( 6.76)  0.50 ( 6.80)  0.53 ( 6.71)  0.55 ( 5.96)  0.56 ( 3.84)
Slovenia  0.05 ( 1.01)  0.04 ( 0.63) 0.07 (0.94) 0.25 (3.06) 0.43 (4.56) 0.71 (4.78)
Current account
deposits
 0.15 ( 3.60)  0.27 ( 5.62)  0.47 ( 7.43)  0.54 ( 7.91)  0.55 ( 6.91)  0.48 ( 3.86)
Savings accounts  0.19 ( 5.34)  0.29 ( 6.77)  0.42 ( 7.60)  0.50 ( 8.39)  0.56 ( 8.21)  0.66 ( 6.04)
1997–2001  0.01 ( 0.48) 0.01 (0.15) 0.04 (0.78) 0.05 (1.05) 0.10 (1.81) 0.12 (1.38)
1998–2002  0.02 ( 0.85) 0.02 (0.57) 0.02 (0.37) 0.03 (0.55) 0.07 (1.22) 0.15 (1.64)
1999–2003 0.01 (0.43) 0.03 (0.83) 0.04 (0.89) 0.07 (1.38) 0.13 (2.35) 0.35 (3.97)
Adjusted R
2 41% 48% 59% 65% 63% 49%
Note: For each independent variable, the given values are the estimated coefﬁcient and the values within the parentheses
arethet-statistic.Allindependentvariablesaredummies.InPanelAandBtheregressionsarebasedonsamplesof96and
210observations,respectively.Thesamplesinclude1996to2003.Regardingthecountry,timeandratedummiesnotethat






















































Sigma convergence of the pass-through in CEECs towards the euro zone
Independent variable Dependent variable = sigma for a +0.25% shock to loan rates Dependent variable = sigma for a +0.25% shock to deposit rates
Impact 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months Long-run Impact 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months Long-run
Panel A: convergence of CEECs towards the aggregate euro zone
Intercept 1.64 (7.36) 0.77 (4.32) 0.73 (3.19) 0.79 (2.76) 0.75 (2.21) 0.64 (1.59) 0.78 (10.59) 0.64 (15.67) 0.54 (14.87) 0.51 (13.13) 0.65 (5.58) 0.48 (8.31)
Consumer loans 0.16 (0.65) 0.77 (3.91) 0.94 (3.72) 1.11 (3.53) 1.27 (3.35) 1.43 (3.21)
Short-term
corporate loans
 0.56 ( 2.15) 0.00 ( 0.01)  0.02 ( 0.09)  0.10 ( 0.31)  0.14 ( 0.36)  0.13 ( 0.28)
Long-term
corporate loans
 0.30 ( 1.13)  0.03 ( 0.13) 0.14 (0.51) 0.03 (0.08) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.04)
Current account
deposits
0.24 (1.02)  0.05 ( 0.40) 0.18 (1.56) 0.34 (2.73) 0.64 (1.74) 0.83 (4.59)
Savings accounts 1.04 (5.90) 0.62 (6.34) 0.55 (6.27) 0.64 (6.86) 2.07 (7.39) 0.67 (4.86)




25% (102) 27% (102) 22% (102) 20% (102) 17% (102) 15% (102) 13% (256) 14% (256) 13% (256) 17% (256) 19% (256) 13% (256)
Panel B: convergence of CEECs towards Finland
Intercept 0.81 (8.22) 0.42 (5.40) 0.51 (6.30) 0.80 (8.52) 0.76 (7.07) 0.33 (3.05) 18.57 (14.05) 25.09 (15.01) 36.63 (14.58) 104.51 (14.57) 51.13 (13.83) 6.97 (11.94)
Consumer loans  0.02 ( 0.17) 0.24 (2.89) 0.15 (1.79)  0.12 ( 1.20)  0.11 ( 0.93) 0.27 (2.28)
Long-term
corporate loans
 0.30 ( 2.59)  0.16 ( 1.80)  0.25 ( 2.67)  0.55 ( 5.06)  0.54 ( 4.37)  0.10 ( 0.80)
Current account
deposits
 11.44 ( 2.74)  19.52 ( 3.70)  32.84 ( 4.14)  101.24 ( 4.47)  52.86 ( 4.52)  7.15 ( 3.88)
Savings accounts  14.29 ( 4.52)  21.25 ( 5.31)  33.89 ( 5.63)  102.16 ( 5.95)  51.66 ( 5.84)  6.68 ( 4.78)




9% (75) 31% (75) 23% (75) 28% (75) 22% (75) 12% (75) 15% (256) 15% (256) 15% (256) 16% (256) 16% (256) 14% (256)
Panel C: convergence of CEECs towards Germany
Intercept 1.40 (5.34) 0.85 (3.90) 0.77 (2.99) 1.14 (3.50) 1.10 (2.80) 0.82 (1.79) 0.65 (21.49) 0.60 (20.58) 0.51 (14.55) 0.47 (13.37) 0.46 (12.07) 0.45 (8.28)
Consumer loans 0.48 (1.64) 0.79 (3.29) 0.98 (3.44) 0.90 (2.50) 1.04 (2.39) 1.30 (2.58)
Short-term
corporate loans
0.41 (1.35) 0.61 (2.43) 0.88 (2.98) 0.79 (2.10) 0.88 (1.95) 1.05 (1.99)
Long-term
corporate loans
0.25 (0.80)  0.06 ( 0.24)  0.04 ( 0.12) 0.17 (0.45) 0.38 (0.82) 0.19 (0.35)
Current account
deposits
0.18 (1.97)  0.11 ( 1.19) 0.18 (1.65) 0.33 (3.00) 0.60 (5.09) 0.83 (4.92)


























































Panel D: convergence of CEECs towards Ireland
Intercept 0.76 (8.22) 0.54 (7.19) 0.63 (7.20) 0.66 (5.67) 0.56 (4.01) 0.47 (2.66) 1.63 (5.49) 1.35 (7.40) 1.43 (7.35) 1.25 (9.11) 1.29 (8.79) 1.36 (7.86)
Consumer loans 0.11 (1.09) 0.25 (2.97) 0.12 (1.28) 0.16 (1.20) 0.23 (1.48) 0.28 (1.40)
Short-term
corporate loans
 0.26 ( 2.45)  0.06 ( 0.68) 0.07 (0.72) 0.22 (1.66) 0.35 (2.20) 0.51 (2.48)
Long-term
corporate loans
 0.23 ( 2.13)  0.17 ( 1.89)  0.15 ( 1.46) 0.04 (0.31) 0.17 (1.04) 0.22 (1.05)




16% (102) 23% (102) 8% (102) 5% (102) 1% (102) 3% (102) 15% (20) 15% (20) 20% (20) 18% (20) 21% (20) 8% (20)
Panel E: convergence of CEECs towards Spain
Intercept 1.68 (9.68) 0.85 (9.97) 0.41 (5.16) 0.45 (4.92) 0.49 (4.41) 0.47 (3.26) 0.66 (22.50) 0.60 (20.71) 0.51 (14.98) 0.48 (13.95) 0.47 (12.36) 0.47 (7.82)
Short-term
corporate loans
 0.72 ( 3.78)  0.21 ( 2.25)  0.13 ( 1.48)  0.02 ( 0.18)  0.02 ( 0.20)  0.04 ( 0.24)
Long-term
corporate loans
 0.48 ( 2.42)  0.30 ( 3.13)  0.25 ( 2.74)  0.05 ( 0.46)  0.08 ( 0.59)  0.03 ( 0.16)
Current account
deposits
 0.08 ( 0.86)  0.15 ( 1.74)  0.08 ( 0.79)  0.08 ( 0.80)  0.03 ( 0.22) 0.01 (0.08)




32% (68) 18% (68) 11% (68)  4% (68)  4% (68)  3% (68) 0% (236) 3% (236) 0% (236) 0% (236) 0% (236) 0% (236)
Note:Foreachindependentvariable,thegivenvaluesaretheestimatedcoefﬁcientandthevalueswithintheparenthesesarethet-statistic.Regardingtheratedummiesnotethatthebenchmarkcaseisdeﬁnedbymortgageratesortimedeposit
rates. Conditional upon the missing values for some national interest rate series (see Table 1), all possible rate dummies are included.5. Conclusions
The messages from our analyses are straightforward: First, on average, the PT in CEECs is
morecompleteandfasterthanintheaggregateeurozone.Second,mostPTdifferenceswithinthe
CEECs can be explained by a handful of ﬁnancial structure variables and macro-controls. To put
it in a nutshell, there may be a high potential for an emerging homogeneous transmission process
across CEECs. Convergence across CEECs can be predicted with market concentration, bank
health, foreign bank participation and monetary policy regime as conditioning factors. Third,
ﬁnancial structure and macro-economic convergence can thus be expected to ‘‘produce’’
monetary transmission convergence. Consequently, with the help of a more competitive market
structure, a healthier banking system, higher foreign bank participation – the ultimate objectives
of the internal market project – and membership in the euro zone, the newcomers may develop a
quite homogeneous monetary transmission region. This may, fourth, lead to a situation where a
relatively homogenous monetary transmission region may join a much more heterogeneous
incumbent euro zone. Fifth, we do not ﬁnd much evidence for convergence towards the euro
zone. While the reduction of short-term multipliers has led to some convergence, the trend
towards a full PT has increased divergence. Consequently, demand for convergence does not
necessarily mean that newcomers should become like the incumbents! The limitations of the PT
in the euro zone are indeed a policy issue. Convergence in euro-zone PT is not an end in itself.
The goal should rather be that banking markets work efﬁciently and competitively in both the
CEECs and the incumbent euro zone. Financial and PT convergence will then follow suit.
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